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Abstract
In [16], Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper ar-
gued in favor of the possibility of considering quantum superpositions
in terms of a paraconsistent approach. There we argued that, even
though most interpretations of Quantum Mechanics (QM) attempt to
escape contradictions, there are many reasons that indicate it could be
worthwhile to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart
and Krause [1] have raised several arguments against this approach.
In the present paper we attempt to answer the main questions and
obstacles presented by them. We will argue, firstly, that the obstacles
presented by Arenhart and Krause are based on a specific metaphysical
stance, which we will characterize in terms of what we call the Ortho-
dox Line of Research (OLR). Secondly, that this is not necessarily the
only possible line, and that a different one, namely, a Constructive
Metaphysical Line of Research (CMLR) provides a different perspec-
tive in which the Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions
(PAQS) can be regarded as a valuable prospect that could be used by
different interpretations of quantum mechanics. Finally, we provide a
set of specific answers to the main problems raised by Arenhart and
Krause in order to clarify our line of research as well as the original
perspective introduced by the PAQS.
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Introduction
In [16], Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper argued in
favor of the possibility of considering quantum superpositions in terms of a
paraconsistent approach. We argued that, even though most interpretations
of Quantum Mechanics (QM) attempt to escape contradictions, there are
many reasons why it could be worthwhile to engage in a research of this
kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause [1] have raised several arguments
against the Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions (PAQS).
Their obstacles are condensed in the following six main statements:
I. The PAQS does not allow for contradictions due to its incompatibil-
ity with the Semantic Requirement, the Minimal Property Ascription
Condition and the Paraconsistent Property Ascription.
II. The PAQS obscures the meaning of probability in QM.
III. The PAQS does not explain the measurement problem.
IV. Contrary to what is claimed by PAQS, contradictions are not observed
in QM.
V. The PAQS inflates unnecessarily the population of the world with
contradictions.
VI. The PAQS does not explain the vanishing of terms in the superposition
after measurement.
First of all we must remark that in [16] we did not propose an interpre-
tation nor a metaphysical scheme but only called the attention to the need
of considering quantum superpositions as ontologically robust and the possi-
bility of doing so in terms of a paraconsistent approach. However, including
contradictions might be regarded as preparing the stage for a metaphysical
step, this is why we believe that —now entering the scenery of metaphysics—
the remarks and considerations of Arenhart and Krause deserve careful at-
tention as well as answers. In this paper we will argue that:
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i) Arenhart and Krause place their obstacles from a specific metaphysical
stance, which we will characterize in terms of what we call the Orthodox
Line of Research (OLR).
ii) That this is not necessarily the only possible line, and that a different one,
namely, a Constructive Metaphysical Line of Research (CMLR) provides a
different perspective in which PAQS can be regarded as a valuable prospect.
Furthermore, that within the CMLR the problems and obstacles raised by
Arenhart and Krause disappear.
Firstly, we will characterize the OLR in order to show later on how the
arguments raised by Arenhart and Krause rely on this particular metaphys-
ical stance. We will also put forward an alternative line, the CMLR, which
implies a different metaphysical stance in order to confront the problem of
interpreting QM in general, and quantum superpositions in particular. We
will argue that the OLR and the CMLR determine a different set of problems
and interpretational strategies. In the second section of this paper we will
analyze the need, implied by the CMLR, of bringing onto stage a different
metaphysical scheme to the one assumed by the OLR. We will discuss the
famous ‘measurement problem’ of the OLR and argue that, from the per-
spective of the CMLR this problem can be inverted and turned into what
we call ‘the superposition problem’. In section 3, we discuss what we know
about quantum superpositions and analyze the meaning of contradiction in
QM as related to the formal understanding of quantum possibility and its
contextual constraints as exposed in the Modal Kochen-Specker theorem.
In section 4, we give specific answers to the six main obstacles mentioned
above. Finally, in the last section, we present some remarks and analyze the
proposal of Krause and Arenhart to understand contradictions in terms of
the square of opposition.
1 Metaphysical Stances, Interpretational Strate-
gies and Problems
In The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen [53, p. xviii] makes a remarkable
claim: “The problem of appearance and reality affects first of all philosophy
itself. I argue for a view of philosophy as a stance, as existential.” To con-
sider philosophy as a stance, as existential, means that our analysis is not
void of values, intentions and presuppositions. These must be made explicit
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in order to be honest about the limits of our own arguments. From this
perspective —which we support— quite immediately we are driven into the
specific consideration of the metaphysical presuppositions that we accept or
not in a given analysis. Physics does not escape this state of affairs, as re-
marked by Einstein [15, p. 1196]: “The problem is that physics is a kind of
metaphysics; physics describes ‘reality’. But we do not know what ‘reality’
is. We know it only through physical description...” Indeed, due to the fact
a physical problem is always constituted through a metaphysical perspec-
tive there is no neutral nor distant questioning regarding a physical object.
Posing a problem involves definite metaphysical presuppositions and choices
without which questions remain meaningless. The problem constitutes the
object of inquiry itself. The problem of interpreting QM, for example, which
makes complete sense from a realist perspective is completely meaningless
from an instrumentalist one. Instrumentalism has a set of problems different
from those of realism. Furthermore, a problem determines —implicitly— its
own set of possible answers, placing in itself a limit to knowledge and un-
derstanding and it is through this same limit that we learn about the world.
As we shall see, posing problems to QM is a subtle task which is some times
betrayed by hidden agendas.
1.1 The OLR (and its Problems)
Let us first start by characterizing the OLR. We can do so in terms of
two main metaphysical presuppositions which seem to have sedimented in
present philosophy of QM. Both presuppositions can be found to play a ma-
jor role not only in most interpretations of QM but also in the problems
posed in the literature. The first one is related to a widespread idea con-
cerning the need to unify different physical theories. As we have discussed
in [20], this is not necessarily the only possible way to understand the re-
lation between theories. Nevertheless this metaphysical ideal has imposed
the need to find a bridge between the quantum formalism and the classical
physical representation of the world. This first presupposition was already
stated by Bohr in terms of his correspondence principle [8].
1. Quantum to Classical Limit: The principle that one can find a
bridge between classical mechanics and QM; i.e., that the main notions
of classical physics can be used in order to explain quantum theory.
The second metaphysical principle which has guided the OLR can be
also traced to Bohr’s claim that physical experience needs to be expressed
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exclusively in terms of classical language [9]. According to Bohr [56, p. 7]:
“[...] the unambiguous interpretation of any measurement must be essen-
tially framed in terms of classical physical theories, and we may say that
in this sense the language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language
of physicists for all time.” Furthermore [56, p. 7] “it would be a miscon-
ception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory may be evaded
by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new conceptual
forms.”
2. Classical Physical Representation: The principle that one needs
to presuppose in any interpretation of QM the representation provided
by classical physics in terms of the entities with definite actual prop-
erties.
If one considers the core of the classical (Newtonian) physical and metaphys-
ical representation of the world1 one is then stuck with two main concepts:
‘entity’ and ‘actuality’ (as a mode of existence). In QM one can also en-
counter these metaphysical notions as basic elements of any interpretation.
Let us make a short detour that will help us to understand not only the im-
portance of these concepts but also their historicity and development —to
which we shall return through the rest of the paper. The notions of ‘en-
tity’ and ‘actuality’ were created by Aristotle. Also ‘potentiality’ played a
major role in Aristotle’s metaphysics: movement was described in terms of
the path from potentiality, which contained the undetermined, contradic-
tory and non-individual realm of existence, to the actual mode of being,
determined through the logical principle of existence (PE), the principle
of non-contradiction (PNC) and the principle of identity (PI). These same
principles allowed Aristotle to put forward —together with classical logic it-
self (see for discussion [54])— the notion of entity. The notion of entity was
capable of unifying, of totalizing in terms of a “sameness”, creating certain
stability for knowledge to be possible. This representation or transcendent
description of the world is considered by many as the origin of metaphysical
thought itself. Actuality is then linked directly to metaphysical representa-
tion and understood as characterizing a mode of existence independent of
observation. Indeed, this is the way through which metaphysical thought
was able to go beyond the hic et nunc, creating a world beyond the world, a
world of concepts. In physics, it was this possibility which allowed us to deal
1See for discussion [26].
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with experience in a counterfactual manner and predict even non-performed
experiments.
The transition from medieval to modern science coincides with the abo-
lition of Aristotelian hylomorphic metaphysical scheme —in terms of poten-
tiality and actuality— as the foundation of knowledge. However, the basic
structure of Aristotelian logic still remained the basis for correct reasoning
[54, p. 7]. As a consequence, potentiality was completely eliminated from
physics. After Newton, only actuality was considered in order to account
for the mode of existence of physical objects. Indeed, in classical mechanics
the representation of the state of the physical system is given by a point
in phase space Γ and the physical magnitudes are represented by real func-
tions over Γ. These functions commute and can be interpreted as possessing
definite (non-contradictory) values independently of measurement, i.e. each
function can be interpreted as being actual. The term actual refers in this
case to preexistence (within the transcendent representation) and not to the
observation hic et nunc. Every physical system may be described exclusively
by means of its actual properties and its evolution, through the evolution of
such (actual) properties. Thus, potential or possible properties are consid-
ered only as the points to which the system might arrive in a future instant
of time. The physics of Newton became a physics of pure actuality, pro-
viding a description of the universe in terms of an Actual State of Affairs
(ASA) [31, p. 124].
Going back to QM, the OLR is based implicitly on this metaphysical
scheme and seeks for answers in terms of the set of (metaphysical) presup-
positions derived from it. But from a methodological perspective it seems
not very smart to take as standpoint, in order to solve problems, presupposi-
tions which —we already know— have problems with the theory in the first
place. If everything seems to point in the direction that QM has problems
with the notions of ‘individuality’, ‘definiteness’, ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘entity’, ‘ac-
tuality’, etc. Why should we keep trying to solve problems with these very
same concepts? Why should we accept that the only way of posing problems
is according to the classical metaphysical scheme? As remarked already by
Dieks [30, p. 1417]: “This would deny the possibility of really new funda-
mental theories, conceptually independent of classical physics.” Due to the
closure of the scheme, the problems posed by the OLR concentrate on jus-
tifying the classical description of the world in terms of entities constituted
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by properties in the actual mode of existence.2 One of the main problems
that interests us here and will be subject of analysis and discussion is the
famous measurement problem (Section 2).
1.2 The CMLR (and its Problems)
We have analyzed in [19] how to separate between two main strategies re-
garding the problem of interpreting QM. The first strategy consists in begin-
ning with a presupposed set of classical metaphysical principles and advance
towards a new formalism that is able to account for such principles. Exam-
ples of this strategy are the collapse theory proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini
and Weber [39] which introduces non-linear terms in the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion and Bohmian mechanics which introduces space-time particles [5].3 The
second strategy consists in accepting the orthodox formalism of QM and ad-
vance towards the creation and elucidation of the metaphysical principles
which would allow us to answer the question: what is QM talking about?
Examples of this second strategy are quantum logic and its different lines
of development such as the Geneva School of Jauch and Piron [48] or the
modal interpretation of Van Fraassen and Dieks [55]. From this perspec-
tive, the importance is to focus on the formalism of the theory and try to
learn about the symmetries, the logical features and structural relations.
The idea is that, by learning about such aspects of the theory we can also
develop the metaphysical conditions that should be taken into account in a
coherent interpretation of QM. However, even within this second strategy
which seems less keen to embrace classical metaphysics, the OLR is very
strong. As a matter of fact, many approaches which take the formalism as a
standpoint end up going back to the classical metaphysical notions that we
have already characterized. Our proposal is to consider the second strategy
but accept the possibility to go beyond the classical metaphysical represen-
tation —in terms of entities or an ASA—, engaging at the same time in the
2We can find many examples of such problems in the literature: the quantum to classi-
cal limit, which was supposedly resolved through decoherence, the problem of non-locality
which implicitly considers space-time in relation to QM, the problem of identical particles
which presupposes the notion of entity and the problem of holism and quantum separa-
bility which also assumes, as a standpoint, that we have quantum systems and that we
can ‘cut’ such systems into parts.
3As remarked by Bitbol [4, p. 8]: “Bohm’s original theory of 1952 is likely to be
the most metaphysical (in the strongest, speculative, sense) of all readings of quantum
mechanics. It posits free particle trajectories in space-time, that are unobservable in virtue
of the theory itself.”
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necessary creation of new concepts in order to find a suitable (non-classical)
metaphysical scheme that would allow us to interpret coherently QM and
its phenomena.
Although we understand that the OLR was, at the beginning, the most
reasonable and obvious path to follow —mainly due to its success over the
three centuries before the creation of QM—, time has proven that this line of
research has not been a very successful one for interpreting QM. As a matter
of fact, after more than one century, we have not seemed to advance very
much in the understanding of the theory nor have we been able to develop
a coherent interpretation. Still today, it is safe to say we do not know what
QM is talking about.
As we remarked already, regarding the quantum to classical limit prin-
ciple of the OLR there exist many philosophical positions which do not
assume the need of a limit between physical theories. Following Heisenberg
we have argued elsewhere in favor of a closed theory approach [20, 21]. As
remarked by Bokulich [6, p. 79]: “The German phrase that Heisenberg uses
is abgeschlossene Theorie, where abgeschlossene can be translated as ‘closed’,
‘locked’, ‘isolated’, or ‘self-contained’.” Heisenberg understands ‘closed the-
ories’ as a relation of tight interconnected concepts, definitions and laws
whereby a large field of phenomena can be described. Every physical theory
needs to develop its own conceptual scheme.4 The radical incommensurabil-
ity assumed by the closed theory approach puts an important restriction to
the metaphysical assumption of a necessary limit between different theories.
The only important aspect to consider a physical theory as ‘closed’ is the
internal coherency between the formal mathematical elements, the concep-
tual structure and the physical experience created by these same concepts.
QM need not be talking about the same as classical mechanics. An im-
portant aspect of this approach is that each physical theory is only able to
attack a restricted set of problems and questions, those which presuppose
the concepts and formal structure put forward by the theory itself.
Taking into account the need to provide a coherent physical interpreta-
tion of QM, our CMLR is based on three main presuppositions already put
forward and discussed in [20, pp. 56-57].
1. Closed Representational Stance: Each physical theory is closed
4As remarked by Heisenberg in an interview by Thomas Kuhn [7, p. 98]: “The decisive
step is always a rather discontinuous step. You can never hope to go by small steps nearer
and nearer to the real theory; at one point you are bound to jump, you must really leave
the old concepts and try something new... in any case you can’t keep the old concepts.”
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under its own formal and conceptual structure providing access to a
specific set of phenomena. The theory provides the constraints to
consider, explain and understand physical phenomena.
2. Formalism and Empirical Adequacy: The formalism of QM is
able to provide (outstanding) empirically adequate results. Empirical
adequacy determines the success of a theory and not its (metaphysical)
commitment to a certain presupposed conception of the world. The
problem is not to find a new mathematical scheme, on the contrary,
the ‘road signs’ point in the direction that we must stay close to the
orthodox quantum formalism.
3. Constructive Stance: To learn about what the formalism of QM is
telling us about reality we might be in need of creating new physical
concepts.
What is needed according to the CMLR is a radical inversion of orthodoxy
and its problems. According to this inversion the features of QM should be
all considered instead as problems, as the main characteristics that must be
considered in the development of a coherent interpretation of the theory.
2 The Superposition Problem: Beyond Entities
and Actuality
The measurement problem is one of the main questions imposed by the
OLR. This problem can be clearly stated in the following manner:
Measurement Problem (MP): Given a specific basis (or CSCO) QM de-
scribes mathematically a state in terms of a superposition (of states), since
the evolution described by QM allow us to predict that the quantum system
will get entangled with the apparatus and thus its pointer positions will also
become a superposition, the question is why do we observe a single outcome
instead of a superposition of them?
As we have extensively discussed in [23] this problem shouldn’t be confused
with the basis problem nor answered by arguing that: in a different basis in
which the Ψ is written as a superposition of one single term the outcome is
not a superposition of pointers but one single pointer “right from the start”.
This is changing the subject of inquiry through a change of basis which is
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also problematic in QM due to the contextual character of the theory. If we
ask about the interpretation of a quantum superposition: c1x| ↑x〉+ c2x| ↓x〉,
given the situation in which a Stern Gerlach apparatus is in the x-direction,
the answer cannot be that if we change the direction of the Stern Gerlach
to the j-direction the superposition will be a single term | ↑j〉 and thus
interpreted in terms of actual state of affairs.
Although the MP accepts the fact that there is something very weird
about quantum superpositions, leaving aside their problematic meaning,
it focuses on the justification of the actualization process. Taking as a
standpoint the single actual result it asks: how do we get there from the
quantum superposition? The questioning is completely analogous to the one
posed by the quantum to classical limit problem: how do we get from weird
QM into our common sense classical physical description of the world? The
MP is thus an attempt to justify why, regardless of QM, we only observe
actuality. The problem places the result in the origin, what needs to be
justified is the already known answer. But, could it be we were asking the
wrong question?
According to the CMLR we need to see the problem from a different per-
spective, we need to think differently. Our approach has attempted to escape
the ruling of the notion of actuality —put forward by the actualist meta-
physical scheme of Newtonian mechanics (Section 1.1)— by inverting the
MP, turning upside-down the focus, concentrating on the physical meaning
of quantum superpositions instead of trying to justify what we already know
[20]. Most interpretations, focusing completely on the MP, have remained
completely silent regarding the physical representation of superpositions.
We believe that the answer to this problem might be the key to truly un-
derstand the latest technical and experimental developments done today in
laboratories around the world [3, 13, 44, 46]. But before stating the problem
some remarks go in order. Firstly, given a Ψ we call a quantum superposi-
tion to any mathematical representation provided in terms of a specific basis
(or context). Second, the MP is context dependent, it needs a specific basis
to be analyzed, if we change the basis to one in which the Ψ is written as one
single term the problem is not being discussed. Third, what is interesting is
how to interpret the most general case of quantum superpositions, namely,
those superpositions in which we have more than one term. In particular,
the superpositions that have a deep difficulty in being interpreted are those
of the type of a Schro¨dinger cat, e.g. c1x| ↑x〉 + c2x| ↓x〉, which are com-
posed by a property and its contradictory (see for discussion [16]). Having
said this we can now state the Superposition Problem in the following terms:
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Superposition Problem (SP): Given a situation in which there is a quan-
tum superposition of more than one term,
∑
ci |αi >, and given the fact that
each one of the terms relates trough the Born rule to a meaningful physical
statement,5 the problem is how do we physically represent this mathematical
expression, and in particular, the multiple terms?
It should be noticed that the outstanding technological and experimen-
tal developments of the last decades is based in superpositions of more than
term and not in the particular superposition of one single term which is
the only one orthodoxy is able to interpret. While the MP focuses in the
explanation of the measurement outcome, the SP concentrates in providing
a physical representation of quantum superpositions themselves. Indeed,
as Heisenberg makes the point [40, p. 264]: “The history of physics is
not only a sequence of experimental discoveries and observations, followed
by their mathematical description; it is also a history of concepts. For an
understanding of the phenomena the first condition is the introduction of
adequate concepts. Only with the help of correct concepts can we really
know what has been observed.” Before we can understand the process of
actualization by interpreting the Projection Postulate (PP) we first need to
find a physical concept which allows us to picture what a quantum superpo-
sition is or represents; for there is an obvious asymmetry in comparing, on
the one hand, a mathematical expression and, on the other, an actualized
outcome.6
Let us, for the sake of the argument, grant that the CMLR is the cor-
rect path to follow —which remains of course a logical possibility. How
should we then proceed? The perspective is quite different from the OLR
regarding what needs to be done in order to interpret QM. If we consider
it as a closed theory we should not concentrate on its relation to classical
physics but rather attempt to develop QM itself —and only later on try to
find out how QM relates to classical physics. In such case we would need to
5In [23, 24] we have defined this notion in the following terms. Meaningful Physical
Statements (MPS): If given a specific situation a theory is capable of predicting in terms
of definite physical statements the outcomes of possible measurements, then such physical
statements are meaningful to the theory and must be constitutive parts of the particular
representation of physical reality that the theory provides. Measurement outcomes must be
considered only as an exposure of the empirical adequacy (or not) of the theory.
6It should be clear that there is no self evident path between the superposition and its
outcome. As it is well known there are multiple ways of interpreting the PP. See for a
discussion [26].
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find new concepts which match the formalism in analogous fashion to the
way the notions of object, space and time allow us to interpret the evolu-
tion of a mathematical point within the mathematical formalism of classical
mechanics.
The logical and ontological PE, PNC and PI created by Aristotle allowed
Newton to develop a metaphysical representation of the physical world based
on the notions of entity and actuality (Section 1.1). QM seems to have many
difficulties to be interpreted following this formal and conceptual scheme. As
a matter of fact QM has problems with all three Aristotelian metaphysical
principles. It has problems with the PE due to the contextual character
of the theory which precludes the global valuation of the properties of a
quantum system [42, 47], it has problems with the PI due to the question
of quantum individuality [36] and it also seems to have problems with the
PNC due to the existence of superpositions [16]. But just in the same
way as non reflexive logics might help us to understand the meaning of
quantum individuals, or that dynamical logics [2] and category theory [14]
might allow us to better understand quantum interactions, the PAQS opens
the door to the possibility of considering physical notions which are not
restricted to the logical PNC. The history of physics is full of developments
directly linked to formal shifts. For example, non-euclidean geometry was
a key formal development which allowed not only to produce new notions
of space and time, but also to create the theory of relativity itself. In the
same way, the introduction of paraconsistent logics might provide a valuable
help to investigate the physical meaning of quantum superpositions. There
are some new formal proposals which following this path are starting to
seriously explore the possibilities of such logical approach [17, 43].
3 Superpositions, Potentiality and Contradictions
in Quantum Mechanics
Fortunately, experimentalists (in actual laboratories!) do not seem to care
much about philosophical discussions regarding QM. Quite independently of
the MP they have kept using quantum superpositions and the orthodox for-
malism in order to produce the most outstanding technical developments of
the last decades. But although we can use superpositions to teleport infor-
mation or implement quantum computers, we still cannot find the physical
concept which unifies all we have learnt about them. Indeed, there are many
characteristics and behaviors we have learnt about superpositions: we know
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about their existence regardless of the effectuation of one of its terms, as
shown, for example, by the interference of different possibilities in welcher-
weg type experiments [13, 44], their reference to contradictory properties, as
in Schro¨dinger cat states [46], we also know about their non-standard route
to actuality, as explicitly shown by the MKS theorem [26, 32], and we even
know about their non-classical interference with themselves and with other
superpositions, used today within the latest technical developments in quan-
tum information processing [3]. In spite of the fact we still cannot say what
a quantum superposition is or represents, we must admit that they seem
ontologically robust.
It should be clear that the importance to find out how to physically
represent quantum superpositions is not only philosophical but also techno-
logical for it is only through physical concepts that really new experiments
can be designed. There are many elements which can be seen as “road signs”
that point in the direction of an ontological interpretation of quantum su-
perpositions. If the terms within a quantum superposition are considered
as quantum possibilities (of being actualized) —and it seems difficult not to
agree with such an idea— then we must also admit that such possibilities
interact according to the Schro¨dingier equation. It is also well known that
one can produce interactions between multiple superpositions (entanglement)
and then calculate the evolution of all terms as well as predict the ratio of all
probable outcomes. It then becomes difficult not to believe that these terms
that ‘interact’, ‘evolve’ and ‘can be predicted’ according to the theory, are
not (in some way) real. This is the main reason, which we find very strong,
to interpret all terms in the superposition as existing (in some way). Since
we know that each term in the superposition relates to a specific possibility
—which can interact with a different possibility— it makes sense to develop
an ontological notion of possibility which supports whatever quantum su-
perpositions are. But, exactly because of what we have learnt already, we
should be careful not to claim —as Arenhart and Krause seem to imply—
that superpositions exist in the realm of actuality.
We believe a reasonable strategy would then be to start with what we
know works perfectly well, namely, the orthodox formalism of QM. Starting
from the formalism, a good candidate to develop a mode of existence is of
course quantum possibility. In several papers, together with Domenech and
Freytes, we have analyzed how to understand possibility in the context of
the orthodox formalism of QM [32, 33, 34, 35]. From this investigation there
are several conclusions which can be drawn. We started our analysis with a
question regarding the contextual aspect of possibility. As it is well known,
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Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem does not talk about probabilities, but rather
about the constraints of the formalism to actual definite valued properties
considered from multiple contexts [42]. What we found via the analysis of
possible families of valuations is that a theorem which we called —for obvi-
ous reasons— the Modal KS (MKS) theorem can be derived which proves
that quantum possibility, contrary to classical possibility, is also contextu-
ally constrained. This means that, regardless of its use in the literature:
quantum possibility is not classical possibility.7 In a recent paper, [26] we
have concentrated on the analysis of the PP within the orthodox frame and
interpreted, following the structure, the logical realm of possibility in terms
of potentiality.
Once we accept we have two distinct realms of existence, namely, poten-
tiality and actuality, we must be careful about the way in which we define
contradictions. Certainly, contradictions cannot be defined in terms of truth
valuations in the actual realm, simply because we have distinguished that
the notion that must interpret superpositions is an existent in the potential
realm —not in the actual one. The MKS theorem shows explicitly that a
quantum wave function implies multiple incompatible valuations which can
be interpreted as potential contradictions [26]. Thus, one can claim that
while contradictions exist in the potential realm, they can never be found in
actuality. Our analysis has always advocated the idea that contradictions —
by definition— are never found in the actual realm. Our attempt is to turn
things upside-down: we do not need to explain the actual via the potential
but rather, we need to use the actual in order to develop the potential [20,
p. 148].
4 Answers to Arenhart and Krause
Now that we have specified our perspective, as well as the stance implicitly
assumed by Arenhart and Krause, we are ready to address more specifically
some of the arguments and obstacles raised by them against the PAQS.
I. The PAQS does not allow for contradictions due to its incompat-
ibility with the Semantic Requirement (SR), the Minimal Prop-
erty Ascription Condition (MPAC) and the Paraconsistent Prop-
7For a discussion regarding the important distinction between mathematical formalism
and physical interpretation, as well as between the algebraic structure, the language and
the meta-language, see: [26, p. 15].
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erty Ascription (PPA).
In order to criticize the notion of contradiction supposedly assumed by the
PAQS, Arenhart and Krause [1] present several conditions which, they claim,
become incompatible within the approach. Firstly they propose the SR:
“Contradictory statements [of the language] must have opposite truth val-
ues.” To analyze a specific situation in QM they take the following quantum
state: α | ↑x> + β | ↓x> and claim that: “The statements corresponding
to properties represented by | ↑x><↑x | and | ↓x><↓x | must have opposite
truth values.” [Op. cit., p. 2] They then proceed to consider two property
ascriptions, the MPAC: “If a system is in an eigenstate of an operator with
eigenvalue v, then the system has the qualitative property corresponding to
such value of the observable.” And the PPA: “When in a superposition,
the system does have the properties related to the vectors forming the su-
perposition, and they are contradictory.” [Op. cit., p. 2] Arenhart and
Krause then argue that: “when the conditions for application of the mini-
mal principle [MPAC] are met, both states have opposite truth values. But
the job is still not done: we must still grant that one of those propositions
must always be the case (being so that the other one will be false), as the
semantic requirement [SR] for a contradiction seems to demand.” [Op. cit.,
p. 5] Their conclusion is then the following:
“[...] it seems that the semantic requirement [SR] that one of the two
terms in a superposition must always be the case (so that we can have
a contradiction) is in fact in conflict with the paraconsistent property
attribution [PPA] principle. For the latter principle to apply, in the
case of a superposition, both ‘up’ and ‘down’ would have to be the
case simultaneously. Recall what happens in the case of the two slit
or Schro¨dinger’s cat: according to this proposal [PAQS], the particle
must go by both slits, the cat must be dead and alive. So, there cannot
be alternate truth values in this case, for both must be simply true.
So, there is a conflict of the paraconsistent property attribution [PPA]
principle with the very requirement that the vectors in a superposi-
tion stand for contradictory properties, at least according to the usual
semantic requirements [SR] related to contradictions, as it appears in
the traditional analysis of this concept. It seems that one cannot have
both the claim that ux [| ↑x><↑x |] and dx [| ↓x><↓x |] are contra-
dictory and the claim that a superposition involves contradictions, as
supplied by the paraconsistent property attribution [PPA] principle.
As it stands, it seems, these demands are incompatible.” [Op. cit., p.
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5]
Let us analyze the presuppositions for the argument to stand. Both
conditions, SR and MPAC, imply an analysis either in terms of actuality
or actualization. But as we mentioned above, the notion of contradiction
that we mean to put forward must consider the realm of potentiality in-
dependently of actuality. If the superposition (as a physical notion) exists
in potential realm, such conditions cannot be taken into account for they
implicitly assume that what is found out in actuality must be directly re-
ferred to superpositions irrespectively of their mode of existence. However,
if different modes of existence —to which such conditions make reference—
are considered, there is plenty of room to take them into account within the
PAQS.
The existence of powers or capacities in Nature is a well known subject of
debate in metaphysics and philosophy of physics [12, 45]. An analogy with
the measurement of a power can show us why the argument of Krause and
Arenhart does not follow irrespectively of the metaphysical considerations
of the subject under study. Let us, for the sake of the argument, admit that
powers (which are not entities) exist in Nature, in a potential realm. For a
more detailed analysis of such interpretations using the notion of power we
refer to [22, 18]. There exist contradictory powers such as ‘putting my hand
up’ or ‘putting my hand down’ (following the PPA). If I ‘put my hand up’
(in actuality) then everyone who is looking will learn that I posses such a
power (as demanded by the MPAC), and at the same time, everyone will
have observed that (in actuality) I did not ‘put my hand down’ (only one
of the two possibilities will be ‘true’ in the actual realm as required by the
SR) —viceversa, when I ‘put my hand down’.8 The expression of a power
in actuality exposes its existence in exactly the same way we can only see
an object when light shines upon it.
Taking into account the Closed Representational Stance (Section 1.2),
every physical theory determines its own specific conditions to expose the
existents of which it talks about. Does the measurement of a power involve
a collapse? The answer is no: the expression of the power does not mean
that the power has been destroyed nor that other powers have ceased to
exist. The fact that I ‘put my hand up’ in actuality does not imply in
any way that I will cease to have this power in the future. Do we need
actuality to claim that a power exists? The answer is no: I could choose
8This is an analogous situation to the one expressed in a situation in which we have
the superposition c1x| ↑x〉+ c2x| ↓x〉.
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not to raise my hand but nonetheless still claim that the power exists —in
the same way that when I close my eyes I can still claim that the table
in front of me exists. As remarked in our Constructive Stance (Section
1.2), actuality is not necessarily considered as a limit to the representation
of reality. This simple example attempts to show that if one moves away
from the metaphysics of ‘entities’ and ‘properties’ in the actual realm, there
are different ways to think about existence and actualization. The classical
physical representation in terms of entities and properties in the actual mode
of existence might not be the end of the road.
What is at stake in QM is the meaning itself of existence —QM does
not seem to make reference to an ASA—, this is why we are not committed
necessarily to a definite metaphysical stance such as the one implied by the
OLR. SR and MPAC are not necessary conditions for every interpretation
of QM that we can think of. They already imply a metaphysical stance in
which reality is conceived only in terms of entities in the actual mode of
existence. But, as we have shown above, if we include the mode of exis-
tence within the conditions themselves, we can certainly take into account
SR, MPAC and PPA within the PAQS. By claiming that PPA refers to the
potential realm while MPCA refers to actualization (something we have dis-
cussed in detail in [26]) and SR to the actual realm, all conditions are met
by the PAQS and the problems raised by Arenhart and Krause disappear.
II. The PAQS obscures the meaning of probability in QM.
In several passages (e.g., pp. 4 and 5) Arenhart and Krause seem to claim
that PAQS does not allow for a good interpretation of probability in the
context of QM. More specifically as they argue on p. 13:
“Besides that lack of additional explanatory power or enlightenment
on the theory [by the PAQS], there are some additional difficulties
here. There is a complete lack of symmetry with the standard case
of property attribution in quantum mechanics. As it is usually un-
derstood, by adopting the minimal property attribution principle, it is
not contentious that when a system is in one eigenstate of an observ-
able, then we may reasonably infer that the system has the property
represented by the associated observable, so that the probability of
obtaining the eigenvalue associated is 1. In the case of superpositions,
if they represented properties of their own, there is a complete disanal-
ogy with that situation: probabilities play a different role, a system
has a contradictory property attributed by a superposition irrespective
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of probability attribution and the role of probabilities in determining
measurement outcomes. In a superposition, according to the proposal
we are analyzing, probabilities play no role, the system simply has a
given contradictory property by the simple fact of being in a (certain)
superposition.”
Some remarks go in order. Firstly, QM does not only talk about proba-
bility. The KS theorem, which we have mentioned before does not talk about
probabilities but about actual definite values of observables. As a mater of
fact, if QM would be only talking about probability, then there would be
no single interpretational problem for the average values of all observables
(commuting or not) are perfectly well defined in the theory. The problem
is that QM does not describe a mere ensemble of individuals. We do not
know what is an individual according to QM (see for discussion [17, 36]),
neither is it clear what is the relation between preexistence and observation.
As we know, it makes no sense to assume that the measurement exposes an
already preexistent ASA as a known paper of Peres express it, in QM “un-
performed experiments have no results.” [47]. (This is why MPAC needs
to be so weak in the first place!) We do not know what it means that a
superposition exists and we do not know how to relate it to actual observa-
tions. But claiming that the PAQS does not allow for a good interpretation
of probability obviously implies that we know what quantum probability is
talking about. This is simply not true. We do not know what quantum
probability means in terms of a physical concept. We do have a physical
interpretation for classical (Kolmogorovian) probability, but this is not the
case in QM. There is a whole literature regarding this point [51], but we can
neither forget that the well known interpretations put forward by Popper,
with his propensity interpretation of probabilities [49], and Bohm, with his
causal interpretation, were specifically designed in order to find an answer
to the meaning of quantum probability.9 The phrase “QM is a probabilistic
theory”, commonly used within the literature (and also addressed by Aren-
9As remarked by Bohm [5, p. 465] himself: “[...] in the usual interpretation two
completely different kinds of statistics are needed. First, there is the ordinary statistical
mechanics, which treats of the distortion of systems among the quantum states, resulting
from various chaotic factors such as collisions. The need of this type of statistics could
in principle be avoided by means of more accurate measurements [...]. Secondly, how-
ever, there is the fundamental and irreducible probability distribution, P (x) = |ψ(x)|2
[...]. The need of this type of statistics cannot even in principle be avoided by means of
better measurements, nor can it be explained in terms of the effects of random collision
processes.”
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hart and Krause), is from our perspective: either an obvious mathematical
statement with no interest —it only states the well known fact that in QM
there is a (non-Kolmogrovian) probability measure assigned via Gleason’s
theorem— or a meaningless physical statement, since we do not know what
quantum probability is in terms of a physical concept. This was a fact al-
ready known to the founding fathers of the theory. For example, as noticed
by Schro¨dinger [10, p. 115] in a letter to Einstein:
“It seems to me that the concept of [physical] probability is terribly
mishandled these days. [Physical] probability surely has as its sub-
stance a statement as to whether something is or is not the case —an
uncertain statement, to be sure. But nevertheless it has meaning only if
one is indeed convinced that the something in question quite definitely
is or is not the case. A [physical] probabilistic assertion presupposes
the full reality of its subject.”
The problem with probability in QM is that due to the formalism there are
serious inconveniences to assert the full reality of the subject, in terms of an
ASA. Finally, we should remark that Arenhart and Krause mix statements
regarding the probability of obtaining one of the terms in a superposition,
before and after the measurement has taken place (see e.g. pp. 4 and 10).
As we shall argue in IV, one needs to be very careful regarding such anal-
ysis for it is also well known that conditional probability does not entail a
necessary interpretation in terms of a collapse.10
III. The PAQS does not explain the MP.
Analyzing the PAQS, Arenhart and Krause [Op. cit., p. 6] also claim the
following:
“PAQS makes it even more difficult to understand how a typical mea-
surement of a system in superposition yields always determinate re-
sults, but not contradictory results: one must be able to explain how
a property possessed by the system disappears, while the other one
remains.”
10As a matter of fact, the conditional probability of obtaining B at t2 given that A was
observed at t1, p(B, t2|A, t1), does not relate in any way the probabilities of measuring A
at t1, p(A, t1), and the probability of measuring B at t2, p(B, t2). I am indebted to Prof.
Dieks for pointing out to me this subtle point of non-collapase interpretations. See for
discussion: [29].
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This remark is focused on the MP and the explanation of the phenomenon
in the actual realm of existence. As we have argued above (Section 2), once
we consider two realms, the problem of actualization cannot be posed exclu-
sively in terms of actuality. Furthermore, Arenhart and Krause claim that
the terms which do not get actualized after measurement suddenly “disap-
pear”, an interpretational move with respect to the PP which is not self
evident and presupposes a (physical) collapse. We will come back to this
interpretational maneuver in VI.
IV. Contrary to what is claimed by PAQS, contradictions are not
observed in QM.
The meaning of observation is of course a subtle point in QM, one at the cen-
ter of all interpretational problems. An important consequence of accepting
the CMLR is that —through the Closed Representational Stance— every
new theory determines a new experience. Following this line of thought we
have criticized the idea that observation in QM must be necessarily consid-
ered in terms of classical space-time experience. In this respect, Arenhart
and Krause have claimed —focusing once again on the MP— that: “For
another disanalogy [of PAQS] with the usual case, one does not expect to
observe a system in such a contradictory state: every measurement gives us
a system in a particular state, never in a superposition.” [1, p. 10]
According to our stance, in order to have a closed experience such as
that provided, for example, by classical physics, there is a need of coherency
between the mathematical structure, the concepts of the theory and the
experience exposed through them. Thus when we say that according to
Newtonian mechanics a cup falls to the floor accelerated at 9.8m
s2
in t1 sec-
onds, there is a coherency of the statement, of the concepts implicitly used
(object, space, time, etc.), the formal prediction (according to the equation
of motion) and experience itself. In QM, because we do not have a coher-
ent language that makes contact with the formal structure, experience is
not really well defined. Instead, what we have is a weird discourse which
constantly contradicts itself. When we talk about “quantum particles”, we
know that they are not particles. Some people argue that “this is just a
way of talking”. As we have attempted to show in this paper, language and,
more specifically, physical concepts determine a definite perspective regard-
ing problems and their solutions articulating our possibilities to think about
experience (see for discussion [28].
Another important aspect regards the fact that one cannot simply “ob-
serve contradictions” (see for discussion: [21, pp. 104-105]). ‘Contradic-
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tions’, like ‘identity’ or ‘causality’, are not something that we find outside
in the world; they are instead the basic metaphysical presuppositions that
shape our theories in order to comprise and make sense of experience. The
fact that contradictions are observed, or not, needs to be addressed from
the standpoint of a coherent interpretation of QM, something we still do
not have. As a matter of fact, we still do not know what expresses, accord-
ing to QM, a ‘click in a detector’.
V. The PAQS inflates unnecessarily the population of the world
with contradictions.
According to Arenhart and Krause [Op. cit., p. 10]:
“[...] when one takes into account other virtues of a metaphysical
theory, such as economy and simplicity, the paraconsistent approach
seems to inflate too much the population of our world. In the presence
of more economical candidates doing the same job and absence of other
grounds on which to choose the competing proposals, the more eco-
nomical approaches take advantage. Furthermore, considering econ-
omy and the existence of theories not postulating contradictions in
quantum mechanics, it seems reasonable to employ Priests razor —
the principle according to which one should not assume contradictions
beyond necessity (see Priest [12])— and stick with the consistent ap-
proaches. Once again, a useful methodological principle seems to deem
the interpretation of superposition as contradiction as unnecessary.”
On the one hand, Arenhart and Krause claim that there are more eco-
nomical interpretations which do exactly the same job the PAQS does. But
what is the job done by the PAQS? The PAQS brings forward the possibility
to interpret all terms in the superposition as physically existent —supporting
the fact that all terms can be ‘described’, ‘put to interact’ and ‘be predicted’
through the Born rule and the Schro¨dingier equation. The price the PAQS
might need to pay is giving up the equation: Actuality = Reality. Thus, the
PAQS allow us to investigate the possibility of considering a contradictory
(potential) realm independent of actuality. Are there many interpretations
that do this job? It is not clear that such is the case.
As a matter of fact, most interpretations of QM do not even consider
quantum superpositions as physical existents (see for a detailed analysis
[23]). For example, the so called Copenhagen interpretation remains agnos-
tic with respect to the mode of existence of properties prior to measurement.
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The same interpretation is endorsed by van Fraassen in his Copenhagen
modal interpretation.11 In Dieks’ realistic modal version, only one of terms
is real (actual), while all other terms are considered as possible (in the clas-
sical sense). Bohmian versions deny right from the start the existence of
quantum superpositions and claim instead the existence of a quantum field
that governs the evolution of particles. One might argue that some inter-
pretations, although not explicitly, leave space to consider superpositions
as existent in a potential, propensity, dispositional or latent realm. The
Jauch and Piron School, Popper or Margenau’s interpretations, are a clear
example of such proposal (see for discussion [20] and references therein).
However, within such interpretations the collapse is accepted and potential-
ities, propensities or dispositions are only defined in terms of ‘their becoming
actual’ —mainly because, forced by the OLR, they have been only focused
on providing an answer to the MP. In any case, such realms are not further
articulated. Only the many worlds interpretation goes as far as claiming
that all terms in the superposition are real in actuality. However, the quite
expensive metaphysical price to pay is to argue that there is a multiplicity
of unobservable Worlds (branches) in which each one of the terms is actual.
The PAQS does the job of allowing a further formal development of
a realm in which superpositions exist, regardless of actuality.12 In the
sense just discussed the PAQS opens possibilities of development which
have not yet been fully investigated. It should be also clear that we are
not claiming that all terms in the superposition are actual —as in the many
worlds interpretations— overpopulating existence with unobservable actu-
alities. What we claim is that PAQS opens the door to consider all terms
as existent in potentiality —independently of actuality. We claim that just
like we need all properties to characterize a physical object, all terms in the
11According to van Fraassen [52, p. 280]: “The interpretational question facing us is
exactly: in general, which value attributions are true? The response to this question can be
very conservative or very liberal. Both court later puzzles. I take it that the Copenhagen
interpretation —really, a roughly correlated set of attitudes expressed by members of the
Copenhagen school, and not a precise interpretation— introduced great conservatism in
this respect. Copenhagen scientists appeared to doubt or deny that observables even have
values, unless their state forces to say so. I shall accordingly refer to the following very
cautious answer as the Copenhagen variant of the modal interpretation. It is the variant
I prefer.”
12Although we believe there is plenty of room to use the PAQS in many interpretations of
QM, the author of this paper has argued elsewhere in favor of a non-collapse interpretation
which considers the potential realm completely independent of actuality. We will discuss
the particular relation of this interpretation to PAQS in [17].
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superposition are needed for a proper characterization of what exists accord-
ing to QM. We do not believe that this is overpopulating metaphysically the
world with contradictions, but rather an attempt to take into account what
both the formalism of QM as well as physical experience in the laboratory
seems to be telling us. Finally, it is important to remark that —as we dis-
cussed in IV— such contradictory potentialities are observable just in the
same way as actual properties can be observed in an object. Potentialities
can be observed through actual effectuations in analogous fashion to physi-
cal objects —we never observe all perspectives of an object simultaneously,
instead, we observe at most a single subset of actual properties.
VI. The PAQS does not explain the vanishing of terms in the
superposition after measurement.
Finally, according to Arenhart and Krause [Op. cit., pp. 10-11]:
“[...] a new problem is created by this interpretation [PAQS], because
besides explaining what is it that makes a measurement give a spe-
cific result when the system measured is in a superposition (a problem
usually addressed by the collapse postulate, which seems to be out of
fashion now), one must also explain why and how the contradictory
properties that do not get actualized vanish. That is, besides explain-
ing how one particular property gets actual, one must explain how the
properties posed by the system that did not get actual vanish.”
Arenhart and Krause seem to assume that once the populated world of
contradictions is measured all terms except one suddenly disappear. This
implies obviously the interpretation of the PP in terms of a collapse (i.e., a
physical interaction) of the quantum wave function. But, it is well known
that such collapse interpretation is not necessarily the only possible inter-
pretation of the PP. We are inclined to assume a non-collapse interpretation
of PP while still considering the specificity of the actualization process in
QM (see for discussion [26]). Thus PAQS might allow us to claim that the
superpositions remain existent (in potentiality) independently of their mea-
surement (in actuality). We should remark that this is also an important
point for modal interpretations. As remarked by P. Vermaas [55, p. 295]:
“In modal interpretations the state is [...] not updated if a certain state of af-
fairs becomes actual. The non-actualized possibilities are not removed from
the description of a system and this state therefor codifies not only what is
presently actual but also what was presently possible. These non-actualized
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possibilities can, as a consequence, in principle still affect the course of later
events.”
5 Final Remarks
Arenhart and Krause have also called the attention to the understanding
of contradiction via the Square of Opposition. Elsewhere, together with
Domenech and Freytes, we have also analyzed via the Square of Opposition
the meaning of quantum possibility. We argued that the notion of possibility
would need to be discussed in terms of the formal structure of the theory
itself and that, in such case, one should not study the Classical Square of
Opposition but rather an Orthomodular Square of Opposition such as the
one explicitly developed in [37]. In [27] we provided an interpretation of the
Orthomodular Square of Opposition in terms of the notion of potentiality.
In a future paper [38] we plan to analyze the proposal of Arenhart and
Krause and discuss the meaning of contradiction relating our Orthomodular
Square of Opposition with the constraints implied in the MKS theorem.
We expect that this analysis will provide us with a better understanding of
contradictions in QM.
As we attempted to show the criticisms of Arenhart and Krause, either
arise from assuming the OLR —to which we are not committed— or by
presupposing certain aspects —e.g., a collapse interpretation of the PP, an
actualist understanding of reality, etc.— that we have never assumed in the
first place. Although the author of this paper has a definite position with
respect to the interpretation of QM, we prefer to leave open the PAQS to
be used by any interpretation of QM.
PAQS allow us to consider a contradictory realm in which all terms
of the superpositions preexist to measurement. In turn this may allow us
to provide a physical interpretation in accordance to the latest technical
and experimental developments that are taking place today (e.g., quantum
computation, quantum teleportation, quantum information processing, etc.)
which use the interaction of all terms in the superposition irrespectively of
the actual measurement outcome.13 It is important to remark that some
new paraconsistent formalizations of quantum superpositions —which go in
13In this respect, the PAQS goes in line, for example, with the ongoing research of
the quantum group at Oxford University Computing Laboratory directed by Abramsky
and Coecke and the projects about quantum interaction directed by Smets at Amsterdam
University.
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line with the proposal presented in [16]— are being developed [17, 43].
We believe that science is about confronting the unknown, it implies a
humble attitude with respect to experience and a critical understanding of
the presuppositions we are willing to make. Science implies the creation
and production of new ways of understanding reality; it is not about trying
to justify that which we already know. We need to become again a child
and observe with admiration and surprise the world that surrounds us, we
need to imagine beyond the limits of the impossible, we need to think the
unthinkable. While we want to be very cautions about what we know and
be (sometimes) very wild about what we do not know, the OLR seems to
desire exactly the opposite. But exactly because science has always taken
advantage from opposite views and perspectives, we believe that our ap-
proach and line of research, although still speculative and in early stages of
development, deserves the chance of being further developed.
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